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ABSTRACT: Patterns in international violence are discovered
through the quantitative analysis of international wars which
resulted in more than 1,000 battle-connected deaths. Between
1816 and 1965, members of the state system participated in 50
such interstate wars and 43 such colonial and imperial conflicts.
Although no secular trends are evident in terms of the fre-
quency, magnitude, severity, and intensity of these wars, the
data suggest a twenty-year cycle in the magnitude of systemic
war. Over two thirds of all of the wars began in either the
spring or the autumn. Major powers have engaged in a dis-
proportionate number of wars and have suffered the most bat-
tle-connected deaths. These same powers, however, have won
most of their wars. Those on the victorious side have often
been the initiators of military hostilities. Enduring military
friendships and enmities have been uncommon over the 150-
year period. Further use of these basic war data should be
helpful in the assault upon the centuries-old problem of the
causes of war.
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SINCE Thucydides, scholars andstatesmen have speculated about
the causes and consequences of conflict
between nation states. Despite the
earnest efforts of countless generations
of investigators, it is only within the past
several decades that any promising at-
tack on the problem of the causes of
war has been mounted. In our judg-
ment, the important turning point in
man’s long quest to understand this re-
current phenomenon occurred in the
1930’s, when Quincy Wright and Lewis
Richardson began to employ operational,
quantitative techniques in the descrip-
tion and analysis of the most pernicious
product of international relations.’
Inspired by the work of these pio-
neers, and borrowing many of their
methodological and theoretical innova-
tions, we have initiated a project whose
major objective is to identify the varia-
bles that are most frequently associated
with the onset of war, from the Congress
of Vienna to 1965 .2 Our first require-
ment was to describe and measure the
dependent variable, and ascertain the
trends and fluctuations in the frequency,
magnitude, severity, and intensity of
war during that period. This task has
now been completed and the data base
we have developed allows us to general-
ize with some degree of confidence about
patterns in international violence over
the last century and a half.-’ Before we
turn to such generalizations, however,
we should explain briefly the data acqui-
sition and coding procedures employed
in our study,
IDENTIFYING THE WARS
Most major studies of war suffered
from an absence of methodological pre-
cision and an invisibility of coding rules.4 4
These practices often resulted in the im-
pressionistic analysis by anecdote of a
few famous and large wars by political
theorists, or the hyper-empirical analysis
of every conceivable sort of violence by
scholars with a mathematical orienta-
tion. Aware of the pitfalls inherent in
both approaches, we have adopted cri-
teria and rules which we feel allow maxi-
mum practicality and efficiency but
which do not violate intellectual stan-
dards of reliability and validity.
Thus, we began by delimiting the sys-
tem in which we were interested. Al-
though it would be useful to know some-
thing about violence in all polities for
all recorded time periods, such an ap-
proach would find us laboring far into
the foreseeable future in the often
barren vineyards of historiography. The
period since 1815, which is manageable
in terms of the availability of historical
sources, satisfies our need both for sys-
temic continuity and for a time span
long enough to allow for any permuta-
tions in the level of violence to evidence
themselves. Within these temporal
bounds, we were concerned with wars
fought by members of the international
system against fellow members (inter-
state wars) and against independent or
1. Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2 vols.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942) ;
Lewis F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly
Quarrels (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1960). In the
third volume of his Social and Cultural Dy-
namics (New York: American Book, 1937),
Pitirim A. Sorokin also applied empirical tech-
niques to a longitudinal study of warfare.
2. For a complete description of the project,
see J. David Singer, "Modern International
War: From Conjecture to Causality," in Albert
Lepawsky ct al., Essays in Honor of Quincy
Wright (in press).
3. Most of the material in this article is re-
ported in other forms in J. David Singer and
Melvin Small, The Wages of War, 1816-1965:
A Statistical Handbook (New York: John
Wiley, 1970).
4. Even Wright and Richardson’s pathbreak-
ing works suffer from these shortcomings to
some degree. Except for the most recent
period, Wright did not order his study of wars
in terms of magnitude or severity, nor did he
present operational criteria for defining his
universe. For his part, Richardson did not
distinguish between the status of political
entities engaged in conflict, nor was he in-
terested in the casualties suffered by the sepa-
rate participants in the wars he studied.
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colonial entities which did not qualify
for membership in the system (extra-
systemic wars). To qualify for member-
ship in the international system, a state
needed to have a population of at least
500,000 and diplomatic recognition from
legitimizers within the international
community.5 In the period after 1920,
membership in the League of Nations or
the United Nations was used as an al-
ternate criterion in some cases. The
adoption of such a scheme results in a
system with 23 members in 1816, 34 in
1870, 61 in 1920, and 124 in 1965.
As for the wars themselves, we gath-
ered data on those conflicts in which the
battle-connected deaths for all systemic
combatants taken together surpassed
1,000. A slightly more complicated pro-
cedure was used to determine the in-
clusion or exclusion of some extra-sys-
temic wars.’ (Civil wars, even those
with foreign intervention, were not con-
sidered in this stage of the project.) All
the qualifying wars were codified in
terms of severity (or battle deaths of
system-member participants) and mag-
nitude (or total number of nation-
months that system-member participants
spent in combat). The 93 wars which
met our criteria are listed in chronologi-
cal order in Table 1, with the 50 inter-
state wars shown in italics. Alongside
each war is its rank position in terms of
battle deaths, nation months, and a sim-
ple intensity measure-number of bat-
tle deaths divided by number of nation
months.7
TRENDS AND CYCLES
After the basic data were reordered
according to the amount of war begun,
under way, and terminated each year,
we were able to search for secular trends
and periodicity over the past century
and a half. Looking first at secular
trends, contrary to what might have
been expected, no trend, either upward
or downward, is evident. That is,
whether we concentrate upon frequen-
cies, magnitudes, severities, or intensi-
ties, we do not find appreciably more or
less war in any of the sub-epochs cov-
ered. Of course, there were more battle
deaths in the twentieth century than in
the nineteenth (thanks to the impact of
the two World Wars and the Korean
conflict), but when the figures are nor-
malized for the number of nations in the
system, this trend disappears. Interna-
tional war, therefore, appears to be
neither waxing nor waning. It is true,
however, that extra-systemic wars have
been decreasing in frequency; but this
is entirely a product of the liquidation of
formal colonial empires and the expan-
sion of the international system to in-
clude all independent entities.
While such findings might cheer those
who intuitively feared that we have been
experiencing an ever-increasing amount
of war as we approach the apocalypse,
they must be balanced with the more
dismal finding that there appears to be
a strong tendency toward periodicity in
the system’s war experiences. Although
cycles are not apparent when we examine
the amount of war beginning in each
year or time period, a discernible peri-
odicity emerges when we focus on mea-
sures of the amount of war under way.
That is, discrete wars do not necessarily
come and go with regularity but with
some level of interstate violence almost
5. A complete explanation of membership
criteria is found in J. David Singer and Melvin
Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering
of the International System, 1815-1940,"
World Politics 18, no. 2 (January, 1966), 236-
282.
6. Because many nineteenth century imperial
conflicts achieved a casualty level of 1,000 bat-
tle deaths only after five or ten years, we
decided that such a conflict had to average
1,000 battle deaths a year for the system mem-
ber in order to qualify for inclusion in our list.
7. Battle-death and nation-month scores for
extra-systemic wars reflect only the war ex-
periences of system members. Many of these
wars would have ranked considerably higher
on all indices had we included non-member
battle deaths and nation months.
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TABLE 1 basic LIST (7F INTERNATIONAL WARS, 1816 1965
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TABLE 1- n (Continued)
always present; there are distinct and
periodic fluctuations in the amount of
that violence. The twenty-year cycle in
the amount of nation-months of war
under way can be seen in the graph in
Figure 1.
Others have discerned similar cycles
which could be related, among other
things, to the time needed for a genera-
tion to &dquo;forget&dquo; the last bloody con-
flict.8 It must be remembered that such
8. See, for example, Frank H. Denton, "Some
Regularities in International Conflict, 1820-
1949," Background 9, no. 4 (February, 1966),
283-296; Frank H. Denton and Warren Phil-
lips, "Some Patterns in the History of Vio-
lence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 12, no.
2 (June, 1968), 182-195; Edward R. Dewey,
The 177 Year Cycle in War, 600 B.C.-A.D.
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FIGURE 1. ANNUAL AMOUNT (IN NATION MONTHS) OF INTERNATIONAL WAR UNDER WAY
1816-1965
analyses assume an interdependence be-
tween the martial activities of all system
members, and that, for example, the in-
cidence of war in the Balkans presum-
ably affects the incidence of war on the
Iberian Peninsula or even in Southeast
Asia. Interestingly, no cyclical patterns
are apparent when we examine the mili-
tary experiences of the individual na-
tions which participated in several wars.
Thus, we must be rather tentative in
affirming the existence of periodicity in
the incidence of war, for our one strong
pattern shows up only when we iso-
late one set of variables among many.
Much more work needs to be done be-
fore we can accept completely the no-
tion of a twenty-year cycle, although
these preliminary findings suggest the
direction in which this work should go.
SEASONS AND WARS
Another way to approach the temporal
variable is to examine the relationship
between season and month and the inci-
dence of war. According to the folklore,
the onset and termination of war should
be determined, in part, by climatological
conditions which might affect military
mobility and efficiency, and the growing
and harvesting seasons which might, in
turn, affect provisioning and recruiting
an army. Some contemporary analysts
would expect most wars to begin between
March 22 and April 20 under the sign of
bellicose Aries, and the fewest to begin
between September 24 and October 23
when the gentle Libra is dominant.
To some degree, our data support the
common folklore although the verdict is
mixed for the astrologists. Of the 93
1957 (Pittsburgh: Foundation for the Study
of Cycles, 1964) ; J. S. Lee, "The Periodic
Recurrence of Internecine Wars in China,"
The China Journal 14, no. 3 (March, 1931),
111-115,159-162.
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wars, 64 began in either spring or
autumn and only 29 in summer and
winter. Moreover, this pattern does
not change much over time; for exam-
ple, 11 of the 21 wars fought since 1920
began in autumn. As for specific
months, April and October saw the initi-
ation of 28 of the 93 conflicts, while
long and bloody wars tended to begin in
July and September. No one season or
month stands out when it comes to the
termination of war. This latter finding,
when compared to the onset patterns,
lends credence to the thesis that policy
makers are influenced by the season
when they consider a war/no-war de-
cision, but that once the war is under
way, more nonrational factors militate
against weather or supplies playing such
a crucial role. Of course, much of this
is conjecture. Before we can attest
with certainty to the proposition that
weather and climate weigh heavily with
the decision-maker, we must compare
similar sets of crises, which did and did
not terminate in war, with specific sea-
sonal variables.
THE WAR PRONENESS OF NATIONS
Whereas systemic patterns of interna-
tional violence are most interesting to
the political theorist, the record of indi-
vidual nations’ martial activities has
long fascinated historians. Many have
argued that some nations (perhaps dur-
ing certain periods) are more aggressive
than others, or that some ethnic groups
are naturally warlike whereas others are
naturally pacific. At the same time,
repeated involvement in war may not
necessarily relate to any innate charac-
teristic but merely to the misfortune of
being geographically proximate to preda-
tory powers. By computing the number
and severity of wars experienced by
each nation during its tenure in the
system, we can obtain a more accurate
indication of the distribution of wars
among the nations, and whether, indeed,
certain nations, or certain classes there-
of, are more prone to war involvement
than others.
In terms of the sheer number of in-
ternational wars, France and England
lead the field with 19 each, Turkey par-
ticipated in 17, Russia 15, and Italy (in-
cluding its predecessor, Sardinia) 11.
All of these nations were members of the
system for the full 150 years. Spain,
which fought in 9 wars, and the United
States, which fought in 6, are two other
charter members of the system with sig-
nificant war experience. Those with a
shorter tenure are led by Austria-Hun-
gary with participation in 8 wars, Greece
and Japan with 7, and Germany (in-
cluding its predecessor, Prussia) with 6.
As might be expected, many of these
nations also sustained the most battle
deaths, with Russia, Germany, China,
France, Japan, England, Austria-Hun-
gary, Italy, and Turkey, in that order,
all suffering 750,000 or more. More-
over, 39 percent of all the system’s na-
tion months of war were accounted for
by 5 nations-France, England, Turkey,
Spain, and Russia-whereas 39 of the
43 extra-systemic wars were fought by
7 states-England 12, France 7, Tur-
key 6, Russia 5, Spain 4, Holland 3, and
Austria-Hungary 2.
Obviously, major powers were the
most war-prone, with Turkey, Spain,
and Greece the only non-majors to ap-
pear in this firmament.9 No major
powers were able to escape this scourge,
which may, in fact, turn out to be a
prerequisite for achievement of that ex-
alted status. On the other hand, most
of the smaller states, and especially
9. Our major powers (reflecting the histori-
ans’ consensus) were England 1815-1965,
France 1815-1940, 1945-1965, Germany 1815-
1918, 1925-1945, Russia 1815-1917, 1921-1965,
Austria-Hungary, 1815-1918, Italy 1860-1943,
United States 1899-1965, Japan 1895-1945, and
China 1950-1965.
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TABLE 2-NATIONAL PERFORMANCES IN INTERNATIONAL WAR, 1816-1965
those in extra-European regions, enjoyed
a fairly pacific record in terms of inter-
national war. Many of these, of course,
experienced long and bloody civil con-
flicts. Still, the fact that more than
half the nations (77 out of 144) which
were at one time or another members of
the system were able to escape interna-
tional war entirely, suggests that mili-
tary conflict between nations is not so
common a systemic activity as some
have posited.
NATIONAL MILITARY ACHIEVEMENT
Although some nations have fought in
more wars than others, they have done
so with varying degrees of success. In-
deed, success in warfare might predict
to frequency of involvement. A nation
which loses several wars might behave
with great circumspection in order to
avoid the necessity of having to go to
war again. Alternately, a military
loss might foster a revanchist spirit,
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or worse yet, it could tempt a third
power which felt it could easily defeat
the nation whose military record was
less than impressive. The data upon
which one might base such generaliza-
tions are offered in Table 2, which shows
each nation’s record of victories and
defeats in all international wars, fol-
lowed by its record for interstate wars
only.tO Experiences in the one stalemate
(the Korean war) have been excluded
from this tabulation.
Thanks to their choice of enemies and
allies, as well as their military capabili-
ties and skills, most of the major powers
have done rather well. The nine na-
tions which were at one time or another
major powers hold six of the first seven
positions and eight of the first thirteen
in terms of won-lost records. The one
major power absent from this galaxy,
China, achieved its poor record while it
was a minor power-since 1950 China
has won two wars and tied in another.
Turkey, as was expected, has a dismal
history in this realm, but the Italians,
often maligned for their legendary mili-
tary ineptitude, nevertheless emerged
victorious in eight of their eleven en-
gagements.
THE INITIATION OF INTERSTATE WAR
A history of involvement in interna-
tional war is a necessary but not suffi-
cient indication of a nation’s bellicosity.
The determination of the initiator of
military conflict, however, may tell us a
bit more about a nation’s aggressive
proclivities. When we speak of initia-
tion here, we are merely identifying the
nation (s) which made the first attack on
an opponents’ armies or territories.
Clearly, initiator and aggressor are not
always identical, as a participant might
provoke its adversary into military ac-
tion by mobilization or other aggressive
diplomatic or economic actions. But the
designation of the initiator of military
aggression should nevertheless provide
some tentative clues as to the relative
belligerency of system members.
In examining the 49 interstate wars in
which we were able to make this desig-
nation, we find that Italy was the actual
initiator (or on the side of the initiator)
on 8 occasions, France played that role
on 6 occasions, Germany and Japan on
5, and Austria-Hungary, Russia, and
Bulgaria on 4Y But when we turn
from sheer number of initiations to the
frequency of initiation compared to the
total number of war experiences, some
of the nations on this infamous list look
a little less bellicose. Whereas Italy
initiated or fought on the side of the
initiator in 8 of her 10 interstate wars,
Germany in 5 of her 6, Japan in 5 of
her 7, Austria-Hungary in 4 of her 6,
and Bulgaria in all of her 4, France ini-
tiated only 6 of her 12 interstate wars
and Russia only 4 of her 10. Among
those nations with significant war ex-
perience which are absent from this list
and therefore, perhaps, more pacific,
are: the two &dquo;sick men&dquo; of Asia, Tur-
key and China; three Balkan states,
Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; and
the two Anglo-Saxon major powers, Eng-
land and the United States.
The decision to initiate hostilities is
related, in part, to the expectation of
victory. Few governments would move
first militarily unless they expected that
10. In some cases, the distinction between
victor and vanquished was difficult to make,
but in the end we "declared" a victor in all
but one of the wars. For our purposes, na-
tions like Poland and Belgium in World War
II, while defeated in the initial stages of the
war, were considered victors since they
emerged at war’s end on the side of the win-
ning coalition.
11. The one case which we did not include
in this analysis was the Navarino Bay inci-
dent of 1827. In several other wars, the label-
ing of one side as initiator came only after
long and troubled consideration.
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such preemption had a high probability
of victory or, at least, of national sur-
vival. Not surprisingly, then, we find
that initiators emerged victorious in 34
of the 49 interstate wars although they
lost 14 times and experienced one stale-
mate. As for battle fatalities, in 36 of
those 49, the initiators lost fewer men
than their opponents, and they were vic-
torious in 6 of those 13 wars in which
their losses were greater than their op-
ponents’. This is an impressive record
when one considers that an attacking
force is generally assumed to lose more
men than a defending force in a given
engagement.
Of course, in almost 40 percent of the
cases, the initiator turned out to be a
major power attacking a minor power.
Of the 19 wars which saw such a one-
sided confrontation, the major power
initiated hostilities on 18 occasions and
won 17 of those 18 contests. 12 When
minors fought minors, the initiator won
14 times and lost 7, but when majors
fought majors, the initiators won 3
times and lost 5. Thus, initiation of
hostilities appears to have been a major
advantage to the combatants, but an
advantage which decreased in impor-
tance when the two sides were more
nearly equal in power.
TRADITIONAL ENMITIES AND
FRIENDSHIPS
A nation’s record of participation, as
well as of success and of failure, in war
has something to do with its historic
long-term relationship to other nations.
Historians and political scientists have
written about the importance of tradi-
tional enmities and friendships between
nations, and speculated as to whether
similar governments, religions, ethnicity,
or stages of economic development affect
the propensity of nations to war against,
or ally with, one another. Moreover,
the experience of conflict against or alli-
ance with a state in one war should
affect future relations with that state in
other wars and crises. In the Statistics
of Deadly Quarrels, Richardson reported
that 48 percent of the pairs who fought
on opposite sides in all wars from 1820
to 1949, fought against each other on
more than one occasion. But he also
found that 29 percent of those pairs who
had been allies in one war had already
fought against each other in an earlier
experience .13 Looking at our more re-
stricted set of wars, we find somewhat
less evidence for the prevalence of his-
torical enmities and alliances.
Of the 209 pairs who fought opposite
each other in our 50 interstate wars,
only 19 percent had fought against each
other before, while 21 percent had been
allies in an earlier war. As for those
pairs with more than one experience in
war (136), of the 95 pairs with some
experience as opponents, 77 of them also
fought at least once on the same side.
Thus, in terms of war experience, few
friendships or enmities have held up
throughout our 150-year period. When
we look only at those nations with 3 or
more experiences as allies and none as
opponents in that period, we find that
France and England have been partners
on 6 occasions, Greece and Yugoslavia
on 4, and Belgium, England and France,
Greece and England, Holland and Eng-
land, and the United States, England,
and France on 3. As for historical en-
mities, those with 3 or more experiences
as opponents and none as allies are Rus-
sia and Turkey with 5 conflicts, Austria-
Hungary and Italy, and China and Ja-
pan with 4, and Germany and France
with 3. While these listings conform to
the historians’ generalizations, the large
number of possible dyadic relationships
requires us to conclude that the notion
12. In 17 of these wars, the major power
shared a border with the minor power. 13. Richardson, op. cit., 196-199.
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of enduring and traditional relationships
in war applies only to a limited number
of famous pairs.
CONCLUSION
The above figures provide a brief, and
necessarily superficial, overview of the
incidence of war in the modern interna-
tional system. While they are of some
intrinsic interest, their major value is
more instrumental in nature. That is,
with such data as summarized here (and
reported more fully in our Wages of 
War) an accelerated assault on the prob-
lem of the causes of war becomes feasi-
ble. A variety of researchers, reflecting
diverse disciplines and numerous theo-
retical orientations, can now undertake
a systematic search for the factors which
account for this organized tribal slaugh-
ter. Whether the focus be on economic
or strategic, psychological or techno-
logical phenomena, the dependent varia-
ble data are now at hand. Our major
purpose was to make such research pos-
sible, and as we explore the problem
from our particular point of view, we
hope others will do likewise. Although
the odds do not seem particularly favor-
able, we might just unravel the mystery
of war’s regularity before we stumble
into its final occurrence.
